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New interfaces between security and development

Jakkie Cilliers

Summary

Post-conflict reconstruction is understood as a complex system that provides for simultaneous short-, medium- and long-term programmes to prevent disputes from escalating, avoid a relapse into violent conflict and to build and consolidate sustainable peace. Post-conflict reconstruction is ultimately aimed at addressing the root causes of a conflict and to lay the foundations for social justice and sustainable peace. Post-conflict reconstruction systems proceed through three broad phases, namely the emergency phase, the transition phase and the development phase; however, they should not be understood as absolute, fixed, time-bound or having clear boundaries. Post-conflict reconstruction systems have five dimensions: (1) security; (2) political transition, governance and participation; (3) socio-economic development; (4) human rights, justice and reconciliation; and (5) coordination, management and resource mobilisation. These five dimensions need to be programmed simultaneously, collectively and cumulatively to develop momentum to sustainable peace.

While there are processes, phases and issues that can be said to be common to most countries emerging from conflict, one should recognise the uniqueness of each conflict system, in terms of its own particular socio-economic and political history, the root causes and immediate consequences of the conflict and the specific configuration of the actors that populate the system. Further, as most intra-state conflicts in Africa are interlinked within regional conflict systems, country specific post-conflict reconstruction systems need to seek synergy with neighbouring systems to ensure coherence across regional conflict systems.

The nexus between development, peace and security have become a central focus of post-conflict reconstruction thinking and practice over the last decade. The key policy tension in the post-conflict setting appears to be between economic efficiency and political stability. While the need and benefits of improved coherence is widely accepted, there seems to be no consensus on who should coordinate, what should be coordinated and how coordination should be undertaken.

1 Introduction

During 2004 and 2005 the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) supported the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) Governance, Peace and Security Programme in the development of what is now known as the *African Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework*.¹ Although not yet fully integrated into the African Union, that framework sets out an African agenda for post-conflict reconstruction and an effort to ensure that peace, security, humanitarian and development dimensions of post-conflict reconstruction systems in Africa are directed towards a common objective. This presentation is entirely based on the African Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework of NEPAD.

Obviously, each country's transition from conflict to peace should be informed by its own particular circumstances. Each specific post-conflict reconstruction system emerges in response to that conflict system's specific set of circumstances and it will thus be unique in its composition, prioritisation, timing and sequencing. At that same time, there are recurrent phases, dimensions and processes that are common to most, if not all, post-conflict reconstruction systems.

For the purposes of the following remarks, post-conflict reconstruction can be understood as a complex system that provides for simultaneous short-, medium- and long-term programmes to prevent disputes from escalating, avoid a relapse into violent conflict, and to build and consolidate sustainable peace.

Post-conflict reconstruction starts when hostilities end, typically in the form of a cease-fire agreement or peace agreement. It requires a coherent and coordinated multidimensional response by a broad range of internal and external actors, including government, civil society, the private sector and international agencies. These various actors undertake a range of inter-related programmes that span the security, political, socio-economic and reconciliation dimensions of society and that collectively and cumulatively addresses both the causes and consequences of the conflict and, in the long-term, establishes the foundations for social-justice and sustainable peace and development. In the short term post-conflict reconstruction is

1 See: <http://www.iss.org.za> (June 2005).

designed to assist in stabilising the peace process and prevent a relapse into conflict, but its ultimate aim is to address the root causes of a conflict and to lay the foundations for social justice and sustainable peace.

2 Post-conflict reconstruction phases

There seems to be a general agreement that most post-conflict reconstruction systems proceed through three broad phases, namely the emergency phase, the transition phase and the development phase. These phases should not be understood as absolute, fixed, time-bound or having clear boundaries. Some countries that form part of a regional conflict system may be in different phases of post-conflict reconstruction. Similarly, different geographic, ethnic, language or religious regions or groups within a country emerging from conflict are likely to be in different phases. Any phased approach should also allow for considerable overlap in the periods of transition between phases. Planning or analysis based on these phases should thus take into account that these phases are not based on causal or chronological progression, but are determined by a wide-range of complex feedback and reinforcement mechanisms.

The **emergency phase** is the period that follows immediately after the end of hostilities and has a dual focus, namely the establishment of a safe and secure environment and an emergency response to the immediate consequences of the conflict through humanitarian relief programmes. The emergency phase is characterised by the influx of external actors usually in the form of a military intervention to ensure basic security, and by humanitarian actors responding to the humanitarian consequences of the conflict.

If there is still a high degree of instability, the military intervention may take the form of a stability operation. Such stability operations are likely to be undertaken by one of the sub-regional brigades of the African Standby Force or a coalition of the willing. Once the situation has been sufficiently stabilised, or if it was relatively secure from the onset of the cease-fire, the military force could form part of a multi-dimensional peace operation deployed by the African Union (AU) or the UN.

The humanitarian actors will typically include various elements of the UN System, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and a wide

range of humanitarian donor agencies and NGOs. The emergency response will be coordinated by UN Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) supported by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). If a UN peace operation is deployed the HC is likely to be one of the Deputy Special Representatives of the Secretary-General (DSRSG).

Preparations will be underway for medium-term rehabilitation and recovery and longer-term development actions and it is likely that some form of needs assessment process will be undertaken during the emergency phase, often culminating in an international donor conference. Internal actors are typically pre-occupied with basic survival and the re-organisation of their social and political systems. As a result external actors often play a prominent role during the emergency phase but they should nevertheless seek every opportunity to involve and consult with internal actors. Depending on the situation the emergency phase typically ranges from 90 days to a year.

The **transition phase** derives its name from the transition from an appointed interim government, followed by, in the shortest reasonable period, some form of election or legitimate traditional process to (s)elect a transitional government, constituent assembly or some other body responsible for writing a new constitution or otherwise laying the foundation for a future political dispensation. The transitional stage typically ends with an election, run according to the provisions of the new constitution, after which a fully sovereign and legitimately elected government is in power.

The transitional phase focuses on developing legitimate and sustainable internal capacity. The focus shifts from emergency relief to recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction. Programmes include efforts aimed at rehabilitation of basic social services like health and education, rebuilding the economic infrastructure, short-term job creation through labour intensive public works, and establishing mechanisms for governance and participation. The security sector is likely to be engaged in transforming the existing police, defence and other security agencies so that they can become representative of the communities they serve and so that they are re-orientated to their appropriate roles in the post-conflict environment.

The relationship between the internal and external players should reflect a growing partnership and a gradual hand-over of ever-increasing responsibility to the internal actors. There should be specific programmes aimed at

building the capacity of the internal actors. The transitional phase typically ranges from one to three years.

The **development phase** is aimed at supporting the newly elected government and the civil society with a broad range of programmes aimed at fostering reconciliation, boosting socio-economic reconstruction and supporting ongoing development programmes across the five dimensions of post-conflict reconstruction highlighted in the next section.

The peace operation, and especially the military and police components, is likely to draw down and withdraw during the early stages of this phase. In the case of a UN peace operation there will be a transition of responsibilities to the UN Country Team and internal actors. The roles and responsibilities of the external actors will change from a post-conflict reconstruction posture back to a more traditional development posture in the latter stages of the sustainable development phase, in other words, the internal actors develop the capacity to take full responsibility for their own planning and coordination, and the external actors provide technical assistance and support.

The post-conflict sustainable development phase typically ranges from four to ten years, but the country is likely to continue to address conflict related consequences in its development programming for decades thereafter.

The transition from one phase to the next is usually determined by the degree to which various conditions within each phase are met and the level of engagement required by the various actors at each level. However, these transitions are not linear and therefore programmes undertaken in one phase are likely to continue for a period into another phase.

3 The dimensions of a post-conflict reconstruction system

Each post-conflict reconstruction system is determined by the interaction of the specific internal and external actors present, the history of the conflict and the processes that resulted in some form of peace agreement. Although the specific configuration of the post-conflict reconstruction system will be unique, it is possible to identify a broad framework of dimensions, phases and issues that appear to be common to most post-

conflict reconstruction systems. There seems to be general agreement that post-conflict reconstruction systems contain the following five dimensions: (1) security; (2) political transition, governance and participation; (3) socio-economic development; (4) human rights, justice and reconciliation; and (5) coordination, management and resource mobilisation. A broad range of programme areas within each dimension is provided in chart 1.

The **security** dimension is responsible for ensuring a safe and secure environment that will enable the civilian humanitarian actors to undertake emergency relief, recovery, rehabilitation and reintegration operations which will prepare the ground for full-fledged reconstruction programmes. In the transitional phase the emphasis gradually shifts to security sector reform aimed at the development of appropriate, credible and professional internal security services. Programmes include security sector review, reform and transformation; disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR); small arms reduction strategies, and enhancing regional security arrangements.

The **political transition, governance and participation** dimension involves the development of legitimate and effective political and administrative institutions, ensuring participatory processes, and supporting political transition. Aside from facilitating elections, programmes include strengthening public sector management and administration; establishing a representative constituting process; reviving local governance; strengthening the legislature; broadening the participation of civil society in decision-making process, and building the capacity of political parties and civil society for effective governance while giving former rebel groups a chance to turn themselves into viable political parties if they so wish. There is typically a focus on engendering a culture of rule of law based on existing or newly formulated constitutions, by supporting justice sector reform and related institutions. The transition phase should focus on the need to ensure plurality and inclusiveness, dialogue and the participation of all constituencies and stakeholders. During the development phase it is important to encourage and develop broad-based leadership at all levels; to build a shared purpose for the nation; to develop national capacity in terms of skills, mobilisation of resources and reviving national infrastructure; to promote good political and economic governance; develop checks and balances to measure progress; and finally, to institute a culture of long-

term assessment of the impact of post-conflict reconstruction activities and programmes.

The **socio-economic development** dimension covers the recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction of basic social and economic services as well as the return, resettlement, reintegration and rehabilitation of populations displaced during the conflict including refugees and IDPs. This dimension needs to focus on an approach that ensures effective dynamic linkages between activities related to the provision of emergency humanitarian needs and longer-term measures for economic recovery, sustained growth and poverty reduction. It is also crucial that balance is struck on the relationship between social capital and social cohesion at all stages of the post-conflict reconstruction process. Programmes to be implemented in this dimension include emergency humanitarian assistance; rehabilitation and/or reconstruction of physical infrastructure; provision of social services such as education, health, and social welfare; and enhancing economic growth and development through employment generation, trade and investment, and legal and regulatory reform.

The **human rights, justice, and reconciliation** dimension is concerned with ensuring accountable judicial systems, promoting reconciliation and nation building, and enshrining human rights. Programmes include justice sector reform and establishing the rule of law; promoting national dialogue and reconciliation processes such as truth and reconciliation commissions, and monitoring human rights. A point often raised is the need to make definitions of human rights, justice and reconciliation accessible to all through the use of local languages and include these concepts in school curricula. A system, which accommodates both restorative and retributive justice, is recommended for Africa, which focuses on African values and includes African traditional mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution. Post-conflict reconstruction programmes within this dimension should also ensure creating an environment conducive to peace, justice and reconciliation; increasing the involvement of women at all levels; reparations, and providing participatory processes which include vulnerable groups. There is the need to rebuild trust and cross cutting social relationships which span across religious, ethnic, class, geographic and generational cleavages in war-torn societies. This is an investment in social capital which underlies the ability of a society to mediate everyday

conflicts before they become violent conflicts, and through building state-people relationships it advances social cohesion.

Coordination, management and resource mobilisation are cross-cutting functions that are critical for the successful implementation of all the dimensions and the coherence of the post-conflict reconstruction system as a whole. All these dimensions are interlinked and interdependent. No single dimension can achieve the goal of the post-conflict reconstruction system – addressing the consequences and causes of the conflict and laying the foundation for social justice and sustainable peace – on its own. The success of each individual programme in the system is a factor of the contribution that this programme makes to the achievement of the overall post-conflict reconstruction objective. It is only when the combined and sustained effort proves successful in the long term that the investment made in each individual programme can be said to have been worthwhile.

Coordination entails developing strategies, determining objectives, planning, sharing information, the division of roles and responsibilities, and mobilising resources. Coordination is concerned with synchronizing the mandates, roles and activities of the various stakeholders and actors in the post-conflict reconstruction system and achieves this through joint efforts aimed at prioritisation, sequencing and harmonisation of programmes to meet common objectives.

4 Conclusion

The nexus between development, peace and security have become a central focus of post-conflict reconstruction thinking and practice over the last decade. The key policy tension in the post-conflict setting appears to be between economic efficiency and political stability. The need for, and benefits of, improved coherence is widely accepted today in the international multilateral governance context.


Although approximately twenty countries have experienced some form of post-conflict reconstruction intervention over the last decade, no generic coordination model has yet emerged that can be further developed and refined for future intervention. One reason why coherence has proven so elusive is the lack of a shared understanding of the role of coordination.

Some external actors see coordination as a vehicle to bring order among the many different agencies whilst others resist coordination because they associate it with losing control over their own independence. The common refrain is that everybody wants to coordinate but no one wants to be coordinated. Whilst it is recognised, on the one hand, that coordination is crucial if we want to achieve coherence in the complex multidimensional post-conflict reconstruction environment, on the other, there seems to be no consensus on who should coordinate, what should be coordinated and how coordination should be undertaken.

The lack of coherence between programmes in the humanitarian relief and development spheres and those in the peace and security spheres have been highlighted by various recent evaluation reports and best practice studies. For example, the Joint *Utstein* Study of peacebuilding, that analyzed 336 peacebuilding projects implemented by Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Norway over the last decade, has identified a lack of coherence at the strategic level, what it terms a "strategic deficit", as the most significant obstacle to sustainable peacebuilding. The *Utstein* study found that more than 55 % of the programmes it evaluated did not show any link to a larger country strategy.

Thus, one of the crucial prerequisites for a coherent post-conflict reconstruction system is a clearly articulated overall strategy against which individual programmes can benchmark their own plans and progress. The overall post-conflict reconstruction strategy is the strategic direction of the operation, taken as a whole, as produced by the cumulative and collective planning efforts of all the programmes and agencies in the system. There is a need to bring all the current strategic planning and funding processes together into one coherent overall country level strategic framework so that the political, security, humanitarian and development aspects of the overall post-conflict reconstruction system are synchronised and coordinated. Such an overall strategic framework needs to be linked to a monitoring and evaluation system so that the various dimensions, sectors and programmes that make up the system can adjust their plans according to the feedback received from others on progress made or setbacks experienced elsewhere in the system.

Chart 1: Goals within each element during the three phases of post-conflict reconstruction			
	<i>Emergency Phase</i>	<i>Transition Phase</i>	<i>Development Phase</i>
Security	Establish a safe and secure environment	Develop legitimate and stable security institutions	Consolidate local capacity
Political Transition, Governance, and Participation	Determine the governance structures, foundations for participation, and processes for political transition	Promote legitimate political institutions and participatory processes	Consolidate political institutions and participatory processes
Socio-economic Development	Provide for emergency humanitarian needs	Establish foundations, structures, and processes for development	Institutionalise long-term developmental programme
Human Rights, Justice and Reconciliation	Develop mechanisms for addressing past and ongoing grievances	Build the legal system and processes for reconciliation and monitoring human rights	Establish a functional legal system based on accepted international norms
Coordination and Management	Develop consultative and coordination mechanism for internal and external actors	Develop technical bodies to facilitate programme development	Develop internal sustainable processes and capacity for coordination
Source: Self-compiled from AUSA / CSIS 2002			



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